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LAND COVENANTS IN PENNSYLVANIA
ALBERT S. BOLLES
The law in Pennsylvania relating to land covenants differs
in several important ways from that in other states. From the
earliest days, law and equity were so blended that many of the
technical rules of the common law have never been applied. The
creation of a covenant of warranty by statute was another de-
parture; and in relieving purchasers of land from payment on
the discovery of defects in the title and encumbrances, "the
courts have gone further," said Justice Woodward,' "than in any
other state or country where the common law obtains." Lastly,
the conveyance of land by a party not in possession and held ad-
versely by another-a principle founded on an English statute
against the sale of pretended titles-which prevaiIs in many
states, forms no part of the land law of Pennsylvania.
We may begin with the inquiry, what is a covenant? On
several occasions the courts have said that whatever shows the
intention of the parties to bind themselves to perform the thing
stipulated may be deemed a covenant without regard to the form
of expression.2 Even a recital that something is intended to be
'Beauplaud v. McKeen, 28 Pa. 124, i3o (1857).
'Taylor v. Preston, 79 Pa. 436 (1875); Waslee v. Rossman, 231 Pa. 219,
227, 8o AtL 643 (19II).
(19)
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done amounts to a covenant to do that thing.3 But a writing in
the form of a deed, though in fact a will, containing a covenant
or warranty, is not a covenant.
4
A more complete conception of a covenant has been given
by Chief Justice Sterrett.
"Neither express words of covenant nor any particular
technical words, nor any special form of words, is necessary
to charge a party with covenant. Any words showing the
intent of the parties to do or not to do a certain thing raise
an express covenant. No special words are necessary to
make a covenant that will run with the land. Words of
proviso and condition will be construed into words of cove-
nant where such is the apparent intention and meaning of
the parties." 5
And when words can be construed either as a condition, re-
servation or covenant, the latter construction is favored.0 In
applying this general rule, a covenant of general warranty of all
and singular the hereditaments and premises described in a deed,
which conveyed real estate and gas with their connections and
appliances, applied only to the title of the real estate conveyed.7
To create a covenant the deed must be signed by both parties.
"How it came to be thought by the profession at an early day,"
said Chief Justice Gibson, "and to be handed down to the present,
that an action might be maintained against the grantee in a deed-
poll under any circumstances, or against anyone who had not
sealed it, I cannot imagine." 8 A poll-deed, however, which is
accepted by the grantee becomes the mutual act of the parties, as
' Christine v. Whitehall, i6 S. & R. 98 (1827) ; Penn v. Preston, 2 Pa. 14
(1829) ; Campbell v. Shrum, 3 W. 6o (Pa. 1834) ; Tryon v. Munson, 77 Pa. 250
(1874) ; Truitt v. Spotts, 87 Pa. 339 (1878) ; Mentz v. Whitcomb, 40 Pa. Super.
553 (19o9).
Scott v. Scott, 7o Pa. 244 (1871).
Electric City Land and Imp. Co. v. Coal Co., 187 Pa. 5o0, 511, 4f Atl. 458
(1898).
' Paschall v. Passman, I5 Pa. 295 (185o) ; McKnight v. Kreutz, 5r Pa. 232
(i866) ; First Methodist Church v. Old Colo. Public Ground Co., 1o3 Pa. 6o8
(1883) ; Dempwolf v. Greybill, 213 Pa. 163, 62 Atl. 645 (r9o6).
"Beale v. Jennings, 129 Pa. 61g, I8 Atl. 55o (1889).
' Maule v. Weaver, 7 Pa. 329 (1847).
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much so as if signed by both,9 and the covenant thereby created
runs with the land. 0 Again, if one is not liable on a deed-poll
in an action of covenant from lack of his seal, he is liable in
assumpsit.11
On many occasions after an agreement has been made for
conveying land, the question has arisen whether the deed made
and presented by the grantor was a sufficient compliance with the
agreement. Thus a covenant to convey in fee simple is satisfied
with a special warranty, in other words, the warranty implied by
the Act of 1715.12 Also, a covenant to convey by a good war-
ranty deed in fee simple implies an obligation on -the part of the
vendor to procure a patent for the land.' 3 In popular phrase a
warranty deed is one with a- special warranty, and a covenant
which requires "a good and lawful deed of conveyance clear of
all incumbrances," is satisfied by a deed of special warranty.'
4
And such a deed suffices where the parties have expressed their
meaning to be only "a warranty deed subject to all the demands
of the Commonwealth." I' Generally the purchaser of land in
fee simple is not entitled to anything more than a covenant against
the acts of the grantor and his heirs, that is, a covenant of special
warranty.' When, therefore, such a deed is given, and the title
to the land proves defective, and an action is brought to recover
therefor, parol evidence is inadmissible to suppoft the allegation
of the vendor that the vendee had bought at his own risk, for
the covenant cannot thus be destroyed.' 7 And if the vendor at
the time of the conveyance knew of the interest of others in the
'Blood v. Crew-Levick Co., 177 Pa. 6o6, 35 Atl. 871 (i896); Reedy v.
Nypano Co., 250 Pa. 251, 95 At. 427 (iqiS). This is the prevailing rule. For
cases see z26 Am. St. Rep. 34 8 (19o9).
"Kelly v. Nypano Co., 2oo Pa. 229, 49 At. 79 (goi).
"Madore's Appeal, 129 Pa. 15, 22, 17 Atf. 804 (i889).
'Espy v. Anderson, 14 Pa. 30S (85o).
'Le Ray De Chaumont v. Forsythe, 2, P. & NV. 5o7 (Pa. i83i).
'Withers v. Baird, 7 W. 227 (Pa. 1838).
" Ibid.
" Withers v. Baird, 7 W. 227, 229 (Pa. 1838) ; Espy v. Anderson, supra note
12; Cadwalader v. Tyson, 37 Pa. 322 (i86o) ; Loyd v. Farrell, 48 Pa. 78 (i864).
' Supra note 16.
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land, he could not bind his vendee who was ignorant; on the
other hand, concealment of his knowledge was a fraud.' 8
If one who has an inchoate or imperfect title to land conveys
it to another by deed of general warranty, and subsequently
acquires a good title to it, this will inure to the benefit of his ven-
dee.19 Nor can he elect to reject the new title and recover the
consideration money paid in an action for breach of covenant of
seisin. He is, however, entitled to compensation for whatever
damages he may have sustained. 20 Likewise the grantor in a gen-
eral warranty deed is bound by his warranty, and cannot, as
against the grantee, acquire title to the land in a proceeding on
a mortgage which was a lien thereon at the date of the deed.
21
Does the covenant include a thing not in esse? This ques-
tion has been thus answered.22 Where the covenant extends to
a thing in esse, for example, to repair a house, the thing to be
done by force of the covenant is annexed and appurtenant to the
thing demised, and goes with the land and binds the assignee,
though he is not bound by express words. 23 But where the cove-
nant extends to a thing not in being, for example, to build a house
on the land demised, the covenant does not run.2 4 If the cove-
nant or condition affect a thing in esse, parcel of the demise, it is
immediately affixed to the estate and binds assigns, whether they
are named by the lessor or not.28 Thus an agreement to pay
rent in all cases binds the assignee.
26
From time to time a warrantor's authority to give a deed of
warranty has been questioned. Thus a tenant by the curtesy
cannot deprive heirs by conveying the land to another, for they
are protected by the ancient Statute of Gloucester, which is a part
iSIbid.
"Logan v. Neill, 128 Pa. 457 (1889) ; Midland Mining Co. v. Lehigh Valley
Coal Co., 136 Pa. 444, 2o Atl. 634 (189o).2 Knowles v. Kennedy, 82 Pa. 446 (1876).
Waslee v. Rossman, supra note 2.
22 See Fisher v. Lewis, i Clark 422 (Pa. 1843).
' Pollard v. Shaffer, i Dall. 210, 211 (U. S. 1787) ; Cathcart v. Bowman,
5 Pa. 317, 319 (1847).
21 Cathcart v. Bowman, supra note 23.
25Jones v. Gundrim, 3 W. & S. 531, 533 (Pa. 1842).
- Ibid.
LAND COVENANTS IN PENNSYLVANIA
of the law of Pennsylvania. By this statute it is provided that
if a tenant by the curtesy aliens with warranty and dies, the heir
is not thereby barred unless he had assets in fee simple by descent
from the tenant of the curtesy; and if lands or tenements thus
descended to the heir, he was barred, having regard to the value
thereof. There has been an interesting application of the statute
in which A, a tenant by the curtesy, conveyed land to B, the deed
purporting to convey the fee with the covenant of general war-
ranty. Afterward A executed an agreement to C and D, who
were entitled to the fee of the aliened premises, as heirs of his
deceased wife, in which, after executing a deed of release with-
out consideration by C and D, for certain of the lands to which
they were entitled as heirs of their mother, he covenanted that he
would not mortgage, sell, or otherwise prejudice their rights as
his heirs at law of their free and equal share of his estate. Sub-
sequently, he made a will directing the equal division of his estate
among his heirs. After his death C and D, who took assets to
greater value than the land conveyed to B, sought to eject B
from it. The court held that at A'& death his heirs took his realty
as heirs by the agreement, and that the land thus taken must be
regarded as assets belonging to them derived from their ancestor,
which estopped them from denying the covenant of warranty
made by him in his deed to B.
27
The authority of a wife who joins in a general warranty
deed with her husband for conveying land belonging to him and
also her right of dower, has been questioned. Nevertheless, she
is bound by such a covenant, nor can she acquire title to the land
in proceedings on a mortgage which was a lien thereon at the
time of executing the deed of warranty and so set up a title
against the grantee. By the Act of June, 1893, the capacity of
a married woman to act became the rule; her incapacity the ex-
ception. This was limited to the mortgaging or conveying of her
real estate unless her husband was joined, and to endorsing and
guaranteeing notes for others. "Except as so limited," says
Justice Brown, "she may do what her husband can do, and when
" Carson v. New Bellevue Cemetery Co., 104 Pa. 575 (1883).
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she does what she has power to do, she is bound by her act." 28
Moreover, as school districts have only such powers as are con-
ferred on them by statute, they have no statutory authority either
express or implied to convey in fee property acquired by eminent
domain, nor enter into a covenant of general warranty made with
the vendee.
29
The way is now clear for describing the different kinds of
warranties. Of these the first is a general warranty. In Eng-
land the covenant of warranty in the feudal days authorized the
vassal to demand of his lord to warrant and defend his gift, and
if he failed to do so and the vassal, was evicted, the lord was
bound to give him another feud of equal value. At a later period
a different method was adopted of inserting in deeds of convey-
ance covenants for title. This insertion has been ascribed to Sir
Orlando Bridgman, an eminent conveyancer in Cromwell's time.
"The various intentions of parties," says Platt, "and the facility
with which they were accommodated to the circumstances con-
nected with titles, soon occasioned their general use in prac-
tice." 80
Of these covenants for title, there are five: (i) that the
vendor is seised in fee; (2) that he has a good right to convey;
(3) that the purchaser and his assigns shall quietly enjoy; (4) for
indemnity against encumbrances; (5) and for further assur-
ance.81 Besides these is the general covenant of warranty. The
distinction between this and the ancient covenant of warranty is
set forth by Chief Justice Gibson.
"The modern covenant of warranty differs from the
ancient warranty, not because the latter bound the feoffer to
defend the land, but because it bound him to render, not
damages, but a recompense in kind for a breach of it. The
form of the writ, as well as the nature of the recompense
"Hagenbuch v. Phillips, 112 Pa. 284, 3 Ail. 788 (1886) ; Kuhn v. Ogilvie,
178 Pa. 303, 35 Adt. 957 (1896) ; George v. Brandon, 214 Pa. 623, 627, 64 Adt.
371 (I9O6).
' School District v. Fess, 98 Pa. 6oo, 6o6 (1883) ; Mulligan v. School Dis-
trict, 241 Pa. 204, 88 Atl. 362 (1913).
30 PLATT, COVENANTS (1829) 304.
'Patten v. M'Farlane, 3 P. & W. 419, 422 (Pa. 1832).
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in value, was different; but the measure of the obligation
was the same. The feoffer was bound by his warranty to
defend the land; the grantor is bound by his covenant to do
as much, and no more, by defending the grantee from evic-
tion on a superior title. By reason of its straitness, even
the modem covenant of warranty has given place in English
conveyances to the common covenants for title against par-
ticular defects which it does not reach. In Pennsylvania, it
has been retained by unprofessed scriveners as a nostrum
supposed to contain the virtue of the whole five; but its
potency has not been recognized by the bench.. The writ
of warrantia charte was founded on an assize, or a writ of
entry in the nature of an assize, brought against the feoffer,
and the covenant of the feoffer was to warrant -the land by
defending the action-the modern writ of covenant is brought
against the grantor to recover damages for a failure to do
so. The gravamen, therefore, is not the defect of title, but
the eviction consequent on it." 32
In Patten v. McFarlane,3 3 Justice Kennedy has explained
the difference between the covenant of general warranty and the
other covenants. The covenant of general warranty may be con-
sidered either as a covenant of seisin, of good right to convey, of
quiet enjoyment, against encumbrances, or further assurance, as
may best suit the wishes of the vendee. It was the inaptitude of
the covenant of general warranty to accommodate itself to the
intention of parties, that gave rise to the special covenants above
mentioned and recommended them to general use.
"Consequently the propriety of introducing a general
warranty on one or more of the special covenants,, and which
of them, must always depend upon the agreement of the
parties, and the particular circumstances under which the
conveyances are to be made. The man who considers him-
self the absolute owner of the estate in fee simple which he
is about to sell and convey, and considers himself also as
receiving a price for it that will indemnify him for doing
so, will annex all those five covenants to his deed of con-
veyance. All, however, cannot be necessary in any case. If
Stewart v. West, 14 Pa. 336, 338 (i85o). See Strong v. Nesbitt, 267 Pa.
294, iio At. 250 (igro).
' Supra note 31.
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the covenant of seisin be inserted, it implies a power and
good right to convey; therefore this last need not be an-
nexed. But a man may have a power and authority
to sell and convey an estate in fee, without being seised
himself, and in such case it would be proper enough for
him in his deed of conveyance to covenant for his having
full power and good right to convey; although it would be
inappropriate as well as indiscreet in him to covenant like-
wise that he was seised; because if he did, it would be a
covenant broken as soon as made, upon which he might be
sued, although the vendee was invested by the deed of con-
veyance which was made to him with a perfectly good title
in fee simple."
In Knepper v. Kurtz,3 4 Judge King, whose opinion was
affirmed on appeal, said in the court below:
"Outside of the legal profession, this covenant is re-
garded as the panacea for every defect that can be alleged
against the title of the grantor, and scriveners, especially
in the rural districts, rarely think of the necessity for any
other. There is, however, a very broad distinction between
a covenant of general warranty and a covenant against en-
cumbrances. In the latter, where encumbrances exist, the
covenant is broken as soon as entered into, while in the
former, the covenant is broken only by an eviction."
In some states the view is maintained that the five cove-
nants are all included in the general warranty. "I can say with
truth," says Justice Lumpkin of the Supreme Court of Georgia,
"after a practice of more than a quarter of a century, that I never
saw a deed containing in so many words definite and precise
covenants of seisin, right to convey, for quiet enjoyment, against
encumbrances, and for further assurance. These are all designed
to be included in the general covenant of warranty of title against
all claims." 35
358 Pa. 480, 482 (1868).
'sLeary v. Durham, 4 Ga. 593, 6oi (1848) ; Eli v. Trent, 195 Ky. 26, 241
S. W. 324 (1922) ; Green v. Irving, 54 Miss. 450, 454 (1877) ; Jeter v. Glenn,
9 Rich. 374 (S. C. 1856).
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"A general warranty, therefore," says Justice Agnew, "is a
real covenant descending with the title and passes to the assigns
by express terms." 36 Moreover, whatever else it may be, it is a
covenant against eviction; runs with the land and is not broken
until there has been an actual or constructive eviction under a
paramount title.3 7 "The covenant protects only against an ouster
from the possession." 38 The right of action accrues when evic-
tion actual or constructive occurs. 39  The covenantee need not
wait to be actually turned out by legal process, for he may sur-
render when the results are plainly inevitable.4 0 But to "sustain
an action upon a covenant of warranty there must be either an
actual or constructive eviction by title paramount." -" A judg-
ment in ejectment by itself is not sufficient. 42  Nor is the opening
of a public highway by exercising the right of eminent domain
an eviction. 43  "All the cases agree," says Justice Sharswood,
"that there must be a change of possession." But a different
rule applies in an action to recover unpaid purchase money.44
How far is the warrantor's possession essential to the valid-
ity of his warranty? If he is in actual possession of the land,
then his covenant runs with it and descends to his heirs and
assigns. But if he was not in possession at the time of making
his covenant, then the continuance of it to the assignee$ has long
agitated the judicial mind. Confining our inquiry to American
tribunals, one of the cases we find most frequently cited and
dearly stating the extreme view is Slater v. Rawson.45  "To
support an action by an assignee in the covenant of warranty,"
"Susquehanna, etc., Coal Co. v. Quick, 61 Pa. 328, 339 (i869).
'Williams v. O'Donnell, 25 Pa. 321, 74 AtI. 205 (19o9) ; Herbert v. North-
ern Trust Co., 269 Pa. 3o6, 313, 112 AtI. 471 (1921).
Mercur, J., in Trutt v. Spotts, 87 Pa. 339, 342 (1878) ; Clarke v. Mc-
Anulty, 3 S. & R 364 (Pa. 1817).
"Stewart v. Webb, 14 Pa. 331 (185o) ; Williams v. O'Donnell, Herbert v.
Northern Trust Co., both supra note 37.
"Knepper v. Kurtz, 58 Pa. 480, 484 (1868).
41Sharswood, J., in Scott v. Scott, 70 Pa. 244, 248 (1871).
"Paul v. Witman, 3 W. & S. 407 (Pa. 1842).
Dobbins v. Brown, 12 Pa. 75 (1849); Wilson v. Cochran, 46 Pa. 229
(1863) ; Peck v. Jones, 70 Pa. 83 (1871).
" Knepper v. Kurtz, supra note'40.
"43z Mass. 450 (184o).
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said Justice Dewey, "it is necessary that the warrantor should
have been seised of the land, for, by a conveyance without such
seisin, the grantee acquires no estate and has no power to transfer
to a subsequent purchaser the covenants in his land, because no
estate passes; there is no land to which the covenant can attach.
If, therefore, the defendant at the time of making his deed was
not seised, then the covenant of warranty did not pass to the
plaintiffs as assignee, and the only liability of the defendant is
upon his covenant of seisin, which covenant for the reason
already stated, is wholly unavailable to the plaintiffs." And the
same rule has been more recently applied in Wisconsin. 46 The
covenants of a grantor of land, if he has no title and no posses-
sion, and the grantee does not take immediate possession, are de-
clared to be personal to the grantee and are not transmitted to
subsequent grantees by a mere conveyance of the land. In Ohio
the same view is maintained. The clear distinction concerning
the nature of the possession or seisin justifies a longer quotation.
"The covenant of seisin is in presenti or in futuro, and
may be personal or real. If it never attach to the land, it is
instantly broken and personal; if it once attach, it is real, and
runs with the land. If the grantor be in actual possession,
claiming adversely, the covenant of seisin runs with the land
and is not broken until the purchaser or those claiming under
him are evicted by paramount title. But if the grantor is
not in actual possession and has not title, the covenant of
seisin is instantly broken and is personal. • If, under such
circumstances, the grantee should see proper to convey, the
purchaser from him could not sue upon the original covenant
of seisin as, with the first grantor, he is neither in privity of
estate or contract, and the covenant in such a case being per-
sonal is a chose in action not transferable, but remains to the
first grantee." 47
As some kind of possession or seisin is needful to carry the
covenant down to an assignee and thus enable him to avail himself
of it, the courts have encountered much difficulty in determining
"' Nesbit v. Nesbit, i Taylor 403 (N. C. 18oi) ; Wallace v. Pereles, iog Wis.
316,85 N. W. 37 (IO9288" Devote v. Sunderland, 17 Ohio 52 (1848).
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what that possession must be. Thus in the second trial of the
Slater case 48 it was held that even a tortious possession by the
covenantor sufficed to attach the covenant to the land, and the
Supreme Court of Illinois went further in questioning the need
of possession in a case founded on a covenant of warranty
against all patent titles. "If," said the Court,49 "the question of
possession is all important in reference to the passing of the
covenant to an assignee, it is not the possession of the covenantor
that is material, but that of the covenantee when he makes his
conveyance. This is the first time that the covenant passes as
attached to the estate. When first made it is made to the cove-
nantee strictly and in person, and he takes the benefit by virtue of
his contract and not as incident to his estate. It can certainly
never be held that if he takes possession and is evicted by para-
mount title he cannot recover because the land was vacant when
the deed was made to him. Even then if we concede that he
must take possession before he can pass the covenant to his
grantee, as attached to the land, we are wholly unable to see why
it does not pass if he has taken possession, or whether the pos-
session or non-possession of the covenantor, when the covenant
was made, has to do with its passing to the grantee of the cove-
nantee." And the Supreme Court of Virginia has gone still fur-
ther in a contention that the contingent interest of one of several
covenantors dependent upon another of them dying without
issue, was a sufficient estate to carry the covenant to an assignee,
and held that it was not needful that any estate should pass from
the covenantor, and that even a stranger could make a covenant
that would pass with the land.5 Nor is this court alone in hold-
ing such an opinion.5
Let us now turn to our own courts. After diligent research
I have found no case in which the question has arisen. And the
reason, doubtless, is that at an early date equity came to the
relief of the complainant who had need of founding his action
'47 Mass. 439 (1843).
"Wead v. Larkin, 54 I11- 489 (I&7o).
Dickinson v. Hoomes, 8 Gratt. 353, 396 (Va. 1852).
See Wead v. Larkin, supra note 49.
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on privity of estate. This was decided in 1796 in Dunbar v. Gum-
per; 52 perhaps the first case in American jurisprudence to hold
that in equity parties and their assigns to covenants who had a
proper knowledge of them were bound notwithstanding their
lack of privity of estate. For this lack adequate knowledge was
held to be an effective substitute.
Incidentally the question was touched in Hawthorn's Ap-
peal.53 A purchaser knew that the vendor had previously sold by
articles of agreement land purchased by him to another. This
sale, however, did not prevent the second purchaser from recov-
ering on his covenant of warranty. Likewise in the Midland
Mining Company case 54 a purchaser bought and paid for several
pieces of land, one or more of which had no actual existence.
Should he proceed against his vendee, inquired Justice Williams,
on his covenants, or should he rescind the contract in totof He
had his election. In Clarke v. McAnulty,5 5 Justice Gibson re-
marked that as it is usual to sell land of which the vendor was
not in possession, a larger operation should be given to the cove-
nant of warranty, because the vendee, who did not obtain actual
possession, would otherwise be without remedy.
Theoretically, of course, a covenant running with land must
be attached to it, or to some interest or estate therein; if un-
attached to anything is worthless. Seemingly, however, in Penn-
sylvania no case has come before the courts in which the ques-
tion has been raised for judicial determination. In many states
the English statute against the sale of pretended titles has been
enacted, but not in Pennsylvania. It was admitted in Cresson v.
Miller 56 that the English rule, that a conveyance by a party out
of possession of land and which was held adversely by another
was void, did not prevail in this State. But it was contended that
great vigilance was required of the vendee, that it was his duty
52 Yeates 74, 77 (Pa. 1796). For leading cases on notice see Whitney v.
Union Ry., ii Gray 359 (Mass. 1858); Parker v. Nightingale, 6 Allen 341
(Mass. 1863) ; De Gray v. Monmouth Beach Club, 5o N. J. Eq. 359 (1892).
3 Aft. 2o (1886).
Midland Mining Co. v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., supra note 19.
"3 S. & R. 364, 372 (Pa. 1817).
"2 W. 276 (Pa. 1834).
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to make inquiries which under different circumstances he could
not be compelled to make. The court declared that all vendees
were bound to take notice of the records in the recorder's office,
but were not bound to seek for secret encumbrances or equities.
There was no intimation, however, that the general warranty in
that case did not run with the land and prevent the right of the
assignee to have recourse to other parties than his immediate
grantor.
How far does the grantee's knowledge of a defect in the
grantor's title affect his covenants of general warranty and for
quiet enjoyment? Knowledge of an existing defect in the title
at the time he accepted the deed does not of itself impair the
covenant. Such a fact is a circumstance to be considered when
it becomes a question whether it was understood and intended that
the covenants were to extend to that particular defect, and the
truth with respect to this may always-be shown.5 7 When the
covenants in a deed are general with nothing expressly excepted,
"the burden is on the grantor who seeks to escape from a liability
fairly covered by the general terms of the covenants to show that
his grantee accepted the title notwithstanding the defect." Il
The general covenant of warranty may be broken as soon as
made; and the existence of a better title with an actual posses-
sion under it in another is of itself a breach of covenant.59
Besides this covenant of general warranty and that of quiet
enjoyment there is an implied statutory covenant founded on the
early provincial Act of 1715, which has played an important part
in the law of land covenants in Pennsylvania. It provides that
"all deeds to be recorded in pursuance of this act, whereby any
state of inheritance in fee simple shall hereafter be limited to the
grantor and his heirs, the words 'grant,' 'bargain,' sell,' shall be
adjudged an express covenant to the grantee, his heirs and as-
signs, to wit, that the grantee was seised of an indefeasible estate
in fee simple, freed from encumbrances done or suffered from
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the grantor (excepting the rents and services due to the lord of
the fee) as also for quiet enjoyment against the grantor, his heirs
and assigns, unless limited by express words contained in such
deed and that the grantee, his heirs, executors, administrators
and assigns, may in any action, assign breaches, as if such cove-
nants were expressly inserted." 60 This statute was interpreted
in the case of Bender v. Fromberger,6' and the words "grant,
bargain and sell" were held to import a general warranty. In the
subsequent case of the Lessee of Gratz v. Ewalt,62 the statute
was more critically interpreted and while it was held that the
words "grant, bargain and sell" by themselves implied a general
warranty, they must not be taken alone but in connection with
the subsequent covenant against encumbrances, for, said Chief
Justice Tilghman, "if it was intended that the covenant should be
that the grantor was seised of an estate absolutely indefeasible,
it was improper to add the subsequent words, 'freed from encum-
brance alone or suffered by him.'" This construction, says
Rawle, has never been departed from in Pennsylvania, and is in
harmony with the British statute on which that of Pennsylvania
was founded.6 3
Still later, in Shaffer v. Greer, 4 Justice Sharswood has re-
marked that the words "grant, bargain and sell" in a conveyance
of fee simple is a covenant, only against acts done or suffered
from the grantor. "The word 'suffered' necessarily implies that
it is not confined to the voluntary acts of the grantor and it has
never been doubted that he is liable on a judgment obtained against
him by adverse proceedings." A more recent construction of the
words "grant, bargain and sell," used in the Act of I715 has been
given by Justice Paxson in Memmert z. McKeen. 65 By virtue of
"Act of May 28, 1715, I Sin. L. 94. See RAWLv, COVENANTS FOR TITmE
(5th ed. 1887) § 285.
a%4 Dall. 436 (18o6).
W2 Binn. 95 (Pa. i8og).
WR.Awi.E, supra note 6o; Dorsey v. Jackmnan, I S. & R. 5o (Pa. 1814);
Seitzinger v. Weaver, I R. 382 (Pa. 1829): Whitehill v. Gotwalt, 3 P. & W. 313
(Pa. 183o); Funk v. Voneida, ii S. & R. iog, iii (Pa. 1834); Knepper v.
Kurtz, supra note 40.
"87 Pa. 370 (1878); Gilham v. Real Estate, etc., Co., ii Pa. D. R. 5o
(1901).
"112 Pa. 315, 320, 4 AtI. 542 (1886).
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this Act the words mentioned "are a covenant of seisin, a cove-
nant for quiet enjoyment and a covenant against encumbrances.
These, the justice declared, were of two kinds, (i) such as affect
the title, and (2) those which affect only the physical condition
of the property. A mortgage or other lien is a fair illustration
of the former, a public road or right of way of the latter. Where
encumbrances of the former class exist, the covenant is broken
the instant it is made, and it is of no importance that the grantee
had no notice of them when he took the title.66 Such encum-
brances are usually of a temporary character and capable of re-
moval; the very object of the covenant is to protect the vendee
against them, hence knowledge, active or constructive, of their
existence, is no answer to an action for breach of such covenant.
Where, however, there is a servitude imposed upon the land which
is visible to the eye, and which affects not title, but the physical
condition of the property, a different rule prevails. Thus it was
held in Patterson v. Archers 67 that where the owner had cove-
nanted to convey certain lots free from all encumbrances, a public
road which occupied a portion of such lots was not an encum-
brance within the meaning of the covenant. This not because
of any right acquired by the public, but by reason of the fact
that the road, although admittedly an encumbrance, and possibly
an injury to the property, was there when the plarchaser bought,
and he is presumed to have had knowledge of it. In such and sim-
ilar cases there is the further presumption that if the encumbrance
is really an injury, such injury was in the contemplation of the
parties, and that the price was regulated accordingly. An encum-
brance of the second class, therefore, an easement for example,
which affects not the title but the physical condition of the prop-
erty, and is presumed to have been known by the grantee, is not
within the meaning of a covenant of a general warranty in a
deed, nor of the covenant established by the Act of 1715."
In applying the statute thus interpreted it includes a tax as-
sessed on the land during the grantor's title.68 But an entry on
"Funk v. Voneida, supra note 63; Cathcart v. Bowman, supra note 23.
:9 V. 152 (Pa. 1839).
'Shaffer v. Greer, 87 Pa. 370 (1878).
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land by authority of the state in the exercise of its rights of
eminent domain is not a breach of the covenant, as the fee of the
land still remains in the owner, and the entry is without his con-
sent.69 Again, if taxes are assessed after a vendor sells land by
articles of agreement and remain unpaid by the vendee, the en-
cumbrance thus created is not an encumbrance "done or suffered
from the grantor" within the meaning of the Act of 1715, defin-
ing the words, grant, bargain and sell.
70
Other applications of the statute have been made to mort-
gages. Thus the covenant against encumbrances implied in the
words, "grant, bargain and sell" will not be enforced to compel
the payment of a mortgage on land sold but not mentioned in the
deed when, by virtue of an agreement between the parties, other
land is subsequently conveyed to the grantee in payment of the
mortgage.
71
On another occasion A by deed "granted, bargained and
sold," land with a special warranty. Previously by a recorded
deed he had conveyed to a stranger the timber on the land with
the privilege of cutting it during a "specified period." This cove-
nant was broken as soon as executed, and notice of the encum-
brance was immaterial before seeking for a remedy.72 More re-
cently a deed conveying real estate underlaid with coal contained
the words, "grant, bargain and sell," and a covenant of general
warranty. Failure to deliver the coal was held to be a breach of
the covenant under the Act of 1715, for which assumpsit was the
proper remedy 7' since the abolition of the distinction between
actions of covenant and assumpsit.74
This statute has been literally enacted in several states; in
others with slight alterations. In Alabama the Supreme Court
has declared that the statute should receive a strict construction,
words should not be extended beyond their ordinary meaning, nor
"Dobbins v. Brown, supra note 43; Ake v. Mason, ioi Pa. 17, 20 (1882).
Gheen v. Harris, 170 Pa. 644, 32 Atl. 1O94 (1895).
"Johnston v. Markle Paper Co., 153 Pa. 189, 25 Atl. 56o (189i).
Cathcart v. Bowman, supra note 23.
Clark v. Steele, 255 Pa. 330, 99 At. IOOi (1917).
"Act of May 25, 1887, P. L. 271 § i, PA. STAT. (192o) § 17177.
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should the contemplated covenants be implied by less than all the
effective words in the statute,7 5 and the same interpretation is
given to the words by the Supreme Court of Arkansas.70  The
Supreme Court of Mississippi has remarked that the words
"grant, bargain and sell" in a deed of conveyance of themselves
import covenants of general warranty of title and against encum-
brances and for quiet enjoyment as effectively as though such
covenants had been expressly contained in the deed.
77
The third kind of covenant of warranty is a special one but
different from the covenant above mentioned. Thus in West v.
Stewart 78 the deed described a lot together with the buildings and
improvements, and the warranty was for "all and singular the
lot of ground with the appurtenances," etc. This covenant was
declared to be "special and extended much further than the terms
of a general warranty." The removal, therefore, of a building
by the tenant under a prior agreement With the grantor was clearly
a breach of the covenant of warranty. It may also be remarked
that the statutory warranty of 1715 is sometimes called an im-
plied warranty, more often a special warranty.79
As privity of contract is personal and confined to the con-
tracting parties, to create a valid covenant that will pass an
estate or interest in land and run therewith, there must also be a
privity of estate between the covenanting parties. Thus if A
leases land to B, receiving rent, and B assigns his lease to C, A
may maintain an action of debt for the rent against C, because
there is a privity of estate between them.80 Many a case has
foundered since the decision in Spencer's Case from lack of
privity of estate, but rarely in Pennsylvania. Most of the appli-
"Roebuck v. Dupuy, 2 AIa. 535 (1841); Gee v. Pharr, 5 Ala. 586 (843);
Parker v. Parker, 93 Ala. 426 (189o); Heflin v. Phillips, 96 Ala. 568 (892).
"Winston v. Vaughan, 22 Ark. 72, 76 (i86o) ; Brodie v. Watkins, 31 Ark.
319 (1876).
"Latham v. Morgan, i Sm. & Marsh. 611 (Miss. Ch. x812); Bush v.
Cooper, 26 Miss. 59_ (1853).
U 7 Pa 122 (z847.
"Withers v. Baird, 7 W. 227 (Pa. z838) ; Espy v. Anderson, 14 Pa. 308, 312
(85o); Cad-walader v. Tryon, 37 Pa. 318, 322 (i86o); Lloyd v. Farrell, 48 Pa.
73, 78 (864).
3°Beach v. Morris, 12 S. & R. 16 (Pa. 1824).
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cations of this principle have been in the construction and en-
forcement of leases. A lessee during his occupation holds both
by privity of estate and of contract. This privity of estate de-
pends upon and exists with the continuance of his term. By an
assignment of the term, his privity of estate is transferred to his
assignee. It, however, remains annexed to the estate, so that
the assignee holds in privity of estate with the original landlord."
In applying this principle to a term of years, sold by a sheriff
under execution, the sale operates and takes effect as an assign-
ment in law. A purchaser at such sale takes the estate liable to
such covenants of the lessee as may have attached to the property
demised. As he assumes these liabilities of the lessee, he takes
all the interest of the assignee in the thing assigned, whether in
possession or in expectancy. He is obliged to perform all the
covenants of his lessor which are annexed to the estate so long
as he retains possession. By accepting possession of the property,
although the assignee may not be named in the original lease, yet
he subjects himself to all the covenants that run with the land.
And if there be a covenant to insure the land which is not merely
personal or collateral, it becomes annexed to the premises and all
its obligations as well as privileges pass to the purchaser of the
term of years.1
2
In the case of the Washington Natural Gas Company 8
3 it
was held that, owing to his privity of contract with the lessor, a
lessee's liability on. his covenant in an oil and gas lease continued
after his assignment of the lease. As an assignee of the lease,
however, was in privity of estate only with the lessor, he was
liable only on his covenant, which was broken while his privity of
estate existed. Each successive assignee was liable on his cove-
nant broken while the title was held by him; 84 but as no contract
relation existed with the lessor he was not liable on a covenant
broken before he acquired the title or that matured after he had
Simons v. Van Ingen, 86 Pa. 330 (1878).
2 Ibid.
'Washington Nat. Gas Co. v. Johnson, 123 Pa. i56, 16 AtI. 799 (x888).
"Ibid.
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parted with it.85 In deciding this case Justice Williams remarked
that an assignee in acquiring the leasehold estate by an assignment
of the lease is fixed with notice of its covenant, and he takes the
estate of his assigns cur onere. But as his liability grows out of
privity of estate, it ceases when the privity ceases. If he had as-
signed before the time for performance, his liability would have
ceased with his title, and liability would have attached to his as-
signee by reason of privity of estate, and so on, toties quoties.
Each successive assignee would be liable for covenants maturing
while the title was held by him because of privity of estate, but he
would not be liable for those previously broken, or subsequently
maturing, because of the absence of any contract relations with
the lessor. While he holds the estate and enjoys its benefits, he
bears its burdens, but he lays down both the estate and its bur-
dens by an assignment, even though his assignment be to a
beggar.
86
A covenant for the performance of some duty in connection
with the possession of land and relating thereto, or in the nature
of rent, or royalty for the use and enjoyment of the premises, is
a covenant running with the land. The rent need not be money;
it may be a share in the crops of a farm or in an oil lease.s T
Moreover an owner of land who executes an oil and gas lease
and, after a default in paying the rental, executes a second lease
to other parties in which it is expressly provided that they shall
stand between him "and all who may have claim to this lease,"
does not thereby declare a forfeiture of the first lease. s8
Again, a lease from A to B to explore on his farm for oil
and "to continue with due diligence and without delay, to prose-
cute the business to success or abandonment, and if successful to
prosecute the same without interruption and for the common
"Fennell v. Guffey, I39 Pa. 341, 20 AtI. io48 (189o); Springer v. Citizen's
Nat. Gas Co., 145 Pa. 43o, 22 At. 986 (i8gi). See Cleminger v. Baden Gas Co.,
i5g Pa. 16, 28 Atl. 293 (1893); Liggett v. Shira, 159 Pa. 350,28 Ad. =i8 (1893).
"Thomas v. Connell, 5 Pa. 13 (1846) ; Wickersham v. Trever, 14 Pa. xo8,
iii i5o); Hannen v. Ewalt, 8 Pa. 9, II (i85); Negley v. Morgan, 46 Pa.
281 (1863) ; Borland's Appeal, 66 Pa. 470 (187o).
'Fennell v. Guffey, supra note 85; Landell v. Hamilton, 175 Pa. 327, 34
At. 663.(x896) ; Stone v. Marshall Oil Co.; 188 Pa. 6o2, 41 Adt. 748 (i898).
' Stone v. Marshall Oil Co., supra note 87.
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benefit of the parties," runs with the land. B assigned an interest
in such a lease to C and D, and they with B assigned an interest
to E who was thereby bound. In a controversy that arose be-
tween them, B contended that his covenant was personal, but failed
in his contention. 9 In another case a land improvement company
reserved all the coal beneath the surface and provided that no
mine or air shaft should be intentionally opened on the surface
of the land. The owners of some of the lots sought to open a
mine and get coal. They were, however, enjoined as the cove-
nant was intended for the protection of all the lots.90
Whether there was a privity of estate and the running of a
covenant has been questioned in agreements relating to the build-
ing of dams across streams of water and the use thereof for mill
purposes. In one of these,9' C and M, adjoining owners on a
stream, made an agreement which provided that C, his heirs and
assigns, should enjoy a water right or power for two wheels, and
M, his heirs and assigns, should enjoy the surplus. The cove-
nants contained in this agreement, said Justice Clark, were by the
covenantors for the mutual benefit of themselves, their heirs,
executors, administrators or grantees, and the present owners
holding the land by conveyance from the covenantors respec-
tively, under the law of this state, were in privity of estate with
them respectively. The court was of the opinion, therefore, that
the covenants in question ran with the land, and defined the rights,
not only of the parties thereto, but of their respective heirs and
assigns.
"To the general rule," continued the justice, in a luminous
opinion that has been often cited in other jurisdictions, "that
between the covenantor and covenantee there must be such a
privity of estate as would formerly have given rise to the rule of
tenure, there are in this state well-recognized exceptions. Cove-
nants capable of running with an assignment of a present estate
of land may, it seems, have that capacity in certain cases, although
no estate passes between the covenantor and covenantee at the
'Bradford Oil Co. v. Blair, 113 Pa. 83, 4 Atl. 218 (1886).
"Electric Co. v. Coal Co., supra note 5.1Horn v. Miller, 136 Pa. 64o, 654, 2o AtI. 7o6 (i8go).
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time of covenant made. The obligations of contract are, in gen-
eral, limited to the parties making them; where privity of con-
tract is dispensed with, there must ordinarily be privity of estate;
but justice sometimes even requires that the right to enjoy such
contract should extend to all who have a beneficial interest in their
fulfilment, not to impose a burden upon an ignorant and innocent
third person, but to enable purchasers of land to avail themselves
of the benefits to which they are in justice entitled. The char-
acter of a covenant of this kind must depend upon the effect of
the entire agreement of which it is a part, and, where the benefit
and the burden are so inseparably connected that each is necessary
to the existence of the other, both must go together; the liability
to the burden will be a necessary incident to the right to take
benefit."
In Lindeman v. Lindsey,92 the owners on opposite sides of a
creek agreed to erect a dam; each was to have the use of half of
the water, with a covenant for themselves, their heirs, and as-
signs, to repair and rebuild. This covenant ran with the land,
the dam having been constructed for-the mutual benefit and ad-
vantage of the parties with direct relation to the enjoyment and
use of the land. "When, therefore," said Justice Sharswood,
"they enter into an agreement to erect such a dam, with a cove-
nant for themselves, their heirs and assigns, to repair or rebuild
it if necessary, it is not a personal covenant merely, but runs with
the lands of the respective owners, and the stipulations contained
in such an agreement in respect to the enjoyment of the water
power created by the dam, form the basis of their respective
rights."
Likewise in Carr v. Lowry 13 there was a grant of an ease-
ment, the right to cut and keep up a tail-race through C's land
for'the benefit of L's adjoining lands, to which was annexed a
covenant of L, his heirs and assigns, to keep the race timbered,
planked and covered with earth. The burden imposed was neces-
sarily incident to the enjoyment of the benefit, and the contract,
so the court held, defined the duties which ought to be performed
'69 Pa. 93 (871); see Jamison v. McCreedy, 5 W. & S. 129 (Pa. 1843).
0327 Pa. 257 (1856y.
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by whoever should be the owner of the mill for the benefit of
which the easement was created. Did this covenant run with the
land? "We cannot presume," said Justice Lowrie, "that L in-
tended to bind his personal representatives to such duties. In the
natural order of affairs, they accompany the ownership of the
property to which they relate, and therefore in the present case
ought to be performed by the heirs or assigns of L, if they claim
under the title then acquired by him. The relation between C
and L, on which the duty depends, was dissolved by L's death, if
not before, and his administratrix can be charged to answer only
for a breach in his lifetime."
In another case the owners of land on opposite sides of the
river agreed to build and repair a dam for the use of their respec-
tive properties. The mill and interest of one of them was sold
by execution on a judgment entered before the making of the
agreement. "The assent of the sheriff's vendee who used the
dam as theretofore and of the remaining co-tenant, was held suffi-
cient to continue the covenants in the agreement, though in strict-
ness not running with the land, because of the priority of the
judgment. If the covenants had been anterior to the lien of the
judgment, then they would in form and in fact have been clearly
covenants running with the land." 94 A verbal license to divert
the water of a stream running through the grantor's land, though
given without consideration, has been held to be equivalent to a
formal conveyance of the right, after the building of a mill in re-
liance thereon. The expenditure of money or labor required in
the enterprise to divert the water-course in a particular way had
the effect of turning the license into an agreement enforceable in
equity. 5 Such a license thus executed is binding on all subse-
quent purchasers."
On the other hand, the cases are infrequent in which the at-
tempts to establish land-running covenants have failed. One of
Campbell v. Hand, 49 Pa. 234 (1865).
'5Rerick v. Kern, 14 S. & R. 267 (Pa. 3,826).
McKellip v. McIlhenny, 4 W. 317 (Pa. 1835); Campbell v. McCoy, 31
Pa. 263 (1858).
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them contained an assignment of an oil and gas lease in considera-
tion of a certain sum paid at the time of the assignment and the
further consideration of $iooo if oil was found in a well drilled
in the land described in the lease, which was operated by the
assignee. This created no covenant running with the land, and
the assignor was not therefore entitled to recover from an an
assignee the $iooo mentioned in the assignment.9 7  Again a
covenant in a deed of conveyance to take the estate granted sub-
ject to the contracts and agreements to which the grantor was
liable as a partner of a firm conveyed the estate clear of every-
thing but a personal covenant of the grantee, and created no
charge on the land.98 Nor does a covenant run between the
vendor of land and an assignee of the purchaser who is to com-
plete payments for the purchase. Thus a person by articles of
agreement conveyed land to another which was to be paid in
installments. On payment of the last installment he was to re-
ceive a deed. He assigned the articles and the land to another who
failed to make the required payments. The vendor then sued the
assignee for the purchase money, but failed in his suit. as there
was neither privity of contract nor of estate between them.99
Moreover, when land subject to a covenant that runs with it
has been conveyed in parcels to several owners, each parcel is en-
titled to the benefit pro rata of the covenant. 00
In equity the test to determine whether a covenant in a deed
runs with the land is the intention of the parties. To ascertain
this, the courts may interpret the words of the covenant in the
light of the surroundings of the parties and the subject of the
grant, and since in Pennsylvania the courts have always looked at
questions from the eye of equity as well as the legal eye, the lack
of privity of estate has not proved a stumbling block, as it has so
often elsewhere, to the running of a covenant with the land where
Fisher v. Guffey, 193 Pa. 393, 44 At. 452 (1899).
U Hepburn v. Snyder, 3 Pa. 72 (846).
"Beach v. Morris, i2 S & R. i6 (Pa. I824).
'McClure v. Gamble, 27 Pa. 288 (1856) ; St. Andrew's Lutheran Church's
Appeal, 67 Pa. 512 (871); Muzzarelli v. Hulshizer, 163 Pa. 643, 3o At!. 29I
(1894).
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the parties thereto had knowledge of it.1 1 Adequate knowledge
has served in equity as an effective antidote for privity of estate.
In Dunbar v. Jumper .0 2 the covenant provided for the grinding
of the lessor's corn sent to the lessee's mill. The court held that
the covenant related to the mill, ran with the land, and was bind-
ing on the assignee. Equity decreed that the assignee should pay
rent after he and his assigns had enjoyed the estate. "And,
though the assignees may not be liable at law for an incorporeal
inheritance for want of privity of estate, yet equity would oblige
them to answer for the rent. If assignees of a lease assign it
over, equity will compel them to pay the rent which became due
during their enjoyment, though the privity of estate was de-
stroyed in law." Indeed, whether the complainant goes into a
court of law or equity, he employs an equitable remedy. Says
Judge Thayer:
"The doctrine relating to covenants running with the
land has been carried in Pennsylvania as far as in any other
state, perhaps further than in some, a fact which may be due
to the fact that if an assignee who has no other remedy can,
as it would seem he may, file a bill in equity; there is no rea-
son why he should not bring covenant in Pennsylvania, where
the courts administer equitable principles through legal
forms." 108
In establishing this equitable principle of notice, as a substi-
tute for privity of estate in land running covenants, an important
step was taken in the way of administering justice long in ad-
vance of the courts in other states. In recent years the most
frequent application of the rule has been in covenants restricting
the mode of building on land. These cases need not be reviewed,
but a few applications of the rule to them may be given. Thus
' Clark v. Martin, 49 Pa. 289, 297 (1865) ; St. Andrew's Lutheran Church's
Appeal, supra note IoO; Muzzarelli v. Hulshizer, supra note ioO; Bald Eagle
Valley R. R. v. Nittany Valley R. R., i7i Pa. 287, 33 Atl. 239 (1895) ; Landell
v. Hamilton, i75 Pa. 327, 34 Atl. 663 (1896) ; Electric Co. v. Coal Co., supra
note 5; McCloskey v. Kirk, 243 Pa. 319, 9o Atl. 73 (1914) ; De Sanno v. Earle,
273 Pa. 265, 270, 117 Atl. oo (1922).
"' Supra note 52.
'03 Provident Life & Trust Co. v. Fiss, 147 Pa. 232, 236, 23 Atl. 56o (1892).
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it has been held that "the manner in which restrictions limiting
the use of land are created may be by reservation in the deed, by
a condition annexed to a grant, by a covenant, or even by parol
agreement of the grantees. When created by covenant, it runs
with the land. Whether it runs with the land or is an easement is
immaterial, provided the creation of the restriction is clearly de-
fined and is understood by the parties at the time. If reasonable,
the restrictions may be enforced in courts of equity against the
land designated to be benefited or burdened in whosoever hands
the lands may be. . . ." 04
While building restrictions are lawful and enforceable, they
are not favored, says Justice Frazer:
"In construing covenants restricting the use of land, we
must bear in mind the general rule that such stipulations will
be construed most strictly against the grantor and in favor
of the free and unrestricted use of the property, and nothing
will be regarded as a violation if that is not in plain disre-
gard of its express word. Such restrictions are not favored
by the law, and the courts will not recognize implied rights
or extend covenants by implication." 105.
If the grantors and grantees of contiguous lots covenant
with each other that each lot shall be subject to similar specified
restrictions, this is a land-running covenant and binds the suc-
cessive owners. Likewise, if the owner of a city lot executes and
delivers to the owner of an adjoining lot an agreement giving to
him the right to insert beams in a wall which he is about to build,
and this is expressly made a covenant runnifig with the land, the
covenantor cannot several years afterward deny the effectiveness
of the covenant as against the owner of the second lot who has
taken title without notice of the agreement, because there was
a failure of consideration.108
Opinion of Miller, P. J., in McCloskey v. Kirk, supra note ioi.
'Crofton v. St. Clement's Church, 208 Pa. 209, 213, 57 AtI. 570 (1904);
Johnson v. Jones, 244 Pa. 386, 389, go At. 649 (194) ; Binswanger v. Hyman,
271 Pa. 296, 299, 114 At. 628 (rg2) ; De Sanno v. Earle, supra note 1or.
St. Andrew's Lutheran Church's Appeal, supra note o0; Knappenberger
v. Fairchild, 21o Pa. 173, 59 At. 986 (i9o4).
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In many cases the reasons for the restriction have greatly
changed or ceased to exist. Nevertheless, if the restriction still
retains some value to the owner of the dominant estate, equity
will restrain a violation of the covenant, provided relief is sought
within a reasonable time.107 If, therefore, a residential neigh-
borhood which is in transition still retains to a considerable ex-
tent its character, the covenant may be enforced.108 A still fur-
ther problem arises whether covenants run with the land for the
benefit of a stranger. This question has been the subject of elab-
orate discussion in some of the states, but has not been raised
in Pennsylvania. 10 9
A covenant by a railway company in a deed for a portion
of its right of way "to fence and keep said road fenced" is a
covenant running with the land and is binding on a successor.
"Though there be no privity of the contract between the original
grantor or his personal representatives, and those in possession of
the land, there is a privity of estate, out of which an implied con-
tract arises to perform, during the period of enjoyment, the con-
ditions upon which the land was conveyed." 110 But when ad-
joining land owners make an agreement concerning the mainte-
nance of a particular fence, after the death of one of them, his
administrator is not bound by the contract for any future re-
pairs.11' An interesting case has occurred of an owner of land
who granted to a street railway passage through his land in con-
sideration of receiving a free electric current and free passes for
members of his family while they resided at their present resi-
dence. The company afterward sought to defeat the grant be-
cause of the family's temporary absence, though it had furnished
' Landell v. Hamilton, supra note Ior.
W" Phillips v. Donaldson, 269 Pa. 244, 246, 112 Atl. 236 (1920) ; Hunter v.
Wood, 277 Pa. 150 (1923).
" Especially in Mygatt v. Coe, 124 N. Y. 212, 26 N. E. 611 (189I), 142
N. Y. 78, 36 N. E. 870 (1894), 147 N. Y. 456, 42 N. E. 17 (I895), 152 N. Y.
457, 46 N. E. 949 (1897). The judges divided four to three in each of the four
appeals.
" Kelly v. Nypano R. R., 200 Pa. 229, 49 At. 779 (901).
'Bland v. Umstead, 23 Pa. 316 (1854). See Dickinson v. Calahan, ig Pa.
227, 233 (1852).
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the current and passes after their return. Needless to add the
company failed.
1 12
A covenant in a ground rent deed does not survive against
executors and administrators except as to the rents which accrued
in the lifetime of the decedent.' 13  And a covenant made by him
whereby he bound himself to be responsible for and guarantee the
payment of the interest on a mortgage until the mortgaged
premises should be so improved as to constitute adequate security
for the mortgaged debt, survives the death of the covenantor and
can be enforced against his personal representatives, so as to re-
cover interest accruing thereafter.114  Said Justice Paxson:
"The general rule is that all personal covenants survive
to the executor or administrator of the covenantor, and to
take a case out of the rule there must be something more than
the mere fact that the covenant is to be performed in futuro.
We are clearly of opinion that the executors of the testator
are bound by his covenant to pay the interest on the mort-
gages in question." 115
A mortgage is so far a conveyance of land that a covenant
real annexed thereto passes to the grantee and his assigns.
And when the land is sold on foreclosure to whom do all the
benefits of the covenant go? To the mortgagee,, or to 'the pur-
chaser of the equity of redemption? The question, though im-
portant, does not seem to have arisen in this state. It was long
ago answered by Chief justice Shaw by saying, "to both accord-
ing to their respective rights in the estate." n6 If two persons
execute a mortgage on their land and subsequently a third person
acquires an undivided interest therein, and the three execute a
deed of general warranty the third person is liable for a breach
11 Humbert v. West Penn R. R., 228 Pa. 44o, 77 Atl. 66x (igxo).
Hunt's Appeals, IoS Pa. 128 (z884).
"ibid.
1 Ibid. 139; Qualn's Appeal, 22 Pa. 5io (1859) ; Williams' Appeal, 47 Pa.
282 (1864) ; Gardiner v. Painter, 3 Phila. 365 (1859). An action for ground
rent under the Act of April, z85o, will lie against the assignee of the lessee for
arrears which accrued before the assignment. McQuesney v. Hiester, 33 Pa.
435 (859).
I White v. Whitney, 44 Mass. 8r, 87 (i84z). See Le Ray de Chaumont v.
Forsythe, supra note r3; Pryor v. Wood, 31 Pa. i42 (x858).
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of it resulting from an eviction under the present title created by
the mortgage.
117
In agreements relating to party walls, formerly a statute
provided that payment by the non-builder should be made to the
builder even though he had parted with his land since building
the wall.11 In 1849 the statute was changed, and the covenant
runs with the land; if, therefore, the builder parts with his title,
the assignee is entitled to payment. 119
In this state, in the sale of real estate, if the vendor's cove-
nant is broken before the vendor has completed payment, he
may detain the purchase-money as a defense. Failure of con-
sideration is the ground of relief.1 20  This, said Justice Wood-
ward, "is a mode of defense peculiar to Pennsylvania." 121 Pre-
viously the justice had remarked that Pennsylvania had gone
farther in relieving purchasers of real estate from payment of
purchase-money, on the ground of defects and encumbrances,
than courts of justice have gone in any other state.
"We administer not only all equitable relief whilst the
contract remains executory, but, after it has been executed by
a deed made and delivered, we give the purchaser, besides
the full benefit of any covenant his deed may contain, the
right to defend himself from payment of the purchase money,
however solemn the instrument by which it is secured, if he
can show a clear outstanding defect or an encumbrance, un-
less he expressly assumes the risk of it." 122
He may therefore detain enough of the purchase money to
cover the damages to which he would be entitled on the
covenant.123 And he may show that the title was defective either
'Williams v. O'Donnell, 225 Pa. 321, 74 At. 205 (19o9).
'Davids v. Harris, 9 Pa. 5oi (1848) ; Todd v. Stokes, io Pa. 155 (1848);
Gilbert v. Drew, io Pa. 219 (1849); Danncker v. Riley, 14 Pa. 372 (1850);
Bell v. Bronson, 17 Pa. 363 (185i).
IKnight v. Benken, 30 Pa. 372 (1858); Voight v. Wallace, i79 Pa. 52o,
524, 36 Ati. 315 (1897).
. Cathcart v. Bowman, supra note 23; Beauplaud v. McKean, supra note i;
Knepper v. Kurtz, supra note 40.
"Wilson v. Cochran, 46 Pa. 229, 230 (1868).
m Beauplaud v. McKean, supra note i.
'Steinhauer v. Witman, i S. & R. 438 (Pa. 1815) ; Hart v. Porter, 5 S. &
R. 201 (Pa. 1819) ; Christy v. Reynolds, 16 S. & P. 258 (Pa. 1827) ; Wilson v.
Cochran, supra note 21.
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in whole or in part, also whether. or not there was a covenant of
general warranty or of a right to convey, or of quiet enjoyment,
or an encumbrance.
124
A purchaser, therefore, who has received his deed and given
a mortgage for the purchase money, may deduct these from en-
cumbrances known to him at the time of making the contract.
125
Likewise, where a vendor covenants to convey a title "clear of
encumbrances" and afterward makes to the vendee a deed with
special warranty, in an action on the mortgage given for the pur-
chase money the vendee may prove that there is an outstanding
right in a third party to enter, mine and carry away coal from
the land conveyed. 126 A vendee, however, cannot maintain an
action of covenant on a general warranty in his deed against his
vendor for the action of the Commonwealth in appropriating a
part of the land conveyed to the vendee to a public use.'1
2 7
On one occasion a vendor by direction of the vendee con-
veyed to the vendee's wife the land sold. A part of the considera-
tion was other land of the vendee which the vendee and his wife
conveyed to the vendor with a general warranty. The title to the
latter land failed and the vendor sued the vendee and'his wife in
foreign attachment in covenant and attached the land cbnveyed
to the wife. He failed to recover a judgment against her, for the
covenant of warranty was held to be merely personal. Said Jus-
tice Sharswood: "The transaction between these parties was a
mutual bargain and sale. The plaintiff took only the personal
covenant of warranty of the defendants, who were husband and
wife. This is an action on that warranty, and nothing is dearer
' Steinhauer v. Witman, spra note 123; Roland v. Miller, 3 W. & S. 390i
395 (Pa. 184) ; Murphy v. Richardson, 28 Pa. 288, 292 (1857) ; Lloyd v. Far-
rell, 48 Pa. 73 (1864) ; Wealdand v. Hoffman, 50 Pa. 513 (1865) ; Herrod v.
Blackburn, 56 Pa. 103, 105 (1867) ; Youngman v. Linn, 6 Pa. 413, 416 (1868);
Cross v. Noble, 67 Pa- 74, 78 (187Q).
'Tod v. Gallagher, r6 S. & R. 263 (Pa. 1827); Wolbert v. Lucas, io Pa.
13 (1848).
'Murphy v. Richardson, supra note 124.
'n Patterson v. Arthur, 9 W. i5a (Pa. 1839) ; Dobbins v. Brown, supra note
43; Marclay v. Miltenberger, 3 Pa. 37 (1856).
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than that it cannot be maintained against the wife." 12S And if
a purchaser has paid part of the purchase money, he may recover
it on discovery that the land was subject to an encumbrance, a
private way, for example, of which he had no knowledge at the
time of his purchase.
1 2 9
There is an important limitation to the vendee's right to with-
hold the purchase money. He cannot withhold payment when he
bought with his eyes open, having a clear knowledge of the de-
fects. The law presumes not only that he knew but paid a smaller
price. This limitation has been dearly set forth by Justice Wood-
ward. 180 Where there is a known defect, but no covenant or
fraud, the vendee can avail himself of nothing, being presumed to
have been compensated for the risk in the collateral advantages
of the bargain. But where there is a covenant against a known
defect, he shall not detain purchase-money unless the covenant
has been broken. If the covenant be for seisin, or against en-
cumbrances, it is broken as soon as made if a defect of title or
encumbrance exists, but if it be a covenant of warranty it binds
the grantor to defend the possession against every claimant of it
by right and is consequently a covenant against rightful evic-
tion.' 81 A vendee therefore with knowledge of the existence of
encumbrances who accepts a deed with a warranty against them
and gives his bond for the purchase money has no defense against
the continued existence of such encumbrances.'"a
Nor is there any distinction between articles of agreement
relating to the tale of land, which is an executory agreement,
and a deed without general warranty where the purchase money
has not all been paid. Says Justice Thompson: "A very different
rule exists where the defects are unknown. There, wherever the
'Dean v. Shelly, 57 Pa. 426, 427 (1868).
McDermott v. Reiter, 279 AtI. 545, 124 AtI. 187 (1924).
'Wilson v. Cochran, supra note 121.
' Fuhrman v. Loudon, 13 S. & R. 386 (Pi. 1825) ; Cadwalader v. Tryon, 37
Pa. 318, 322 (i86o); Wilson's Appeal, iog Pa. 6o6, 6og (1885); Lazarus v.
Lehigh Coal Co., 246 Pa. 178, 92 Atl. 121 (1914).
' Fuhrman v. Loudon, 13 S. & R. 386 (Pa. 1825) ; Allen v. Martin, 2 P. &
W. 31o (Pa. 1831); Lighty v. Short, 3 P. & W. 447 (Pa. x832); Roland v.
Tierman, 8 W. & S. 193 (Pa. 1844); Bradford v. Polts, 9 Pa. 37 (1848);
Luken v. Jones, 4 Phila. 18 (186o).
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purchase-money remains unpaid, if there is no covenant of war-
ranty the money may be retained." 133
The vendee is not obliged to restore possession to the ven-
dor before availing himself of the detention of the purchase-
money as a defense. 134 But he cannot keep both the land and the
purchase-money. 135 On the other hand, it is the vendor's busi-
ness, if he finds that he cannot make such a title as the vendee is
bound to accept, to refund what has been paid and bring an
action of ejectment to recover the property.136
While these are the leading rules that apply to the most
general class of vendors, they do not apply to fiduciary vendors,
who have no interest in the subject of the sale, or only a mere
naked title. From these the purchaser is entitled to no covenants
save that the grantor has done no act to encumber the estate, in
other words, "the usual trustee covenant.'" "Indeed," says Rawle,
"few persons could be found to act in a fiduciary or representa-
tive capacity if they were compellable to enter into covenants of
greater scope." 137 Nor can any express covenants be demanded
from ministerial officers, sheriffs, marshals, tax collectors and the-
like, or be implied from any words of grant or leasing.138
"To maintain an action for breach of the covenant," says
Justice Woodward, "an eviction must be laid and proved, not
necessarily by judicial process or the application of physical force,
but by the legal force of an irresistible title. There must be proof,
at the least, of an involuntary loss of the possession, and as the
right to detain purchase-money is of the nature of an action in
the covenant, and is allowed to prevent circuity, the vendee who
seeks to detain by virtue of a covenant of warranty is as much
bound to prove an eviction as if he were the plaintiff in an action
of covenant. Until eviction the covenant is part of the considera-
Cadwalader v. Tryon, supra note 131.
Hart v. Porter, Steinhauer v. Witman, Christy v. Reynolds, Wilson v.
Cochran, all supra note 123; Gans v. Renshaw, 2 Pa. 34 (1845).
Smith v. Webster, z Pa. 34 (x845).
Gans v. Renshaw, supra note 134.
RAw:LE supra at 43. See Shontz v. Brown, 27 Pa. 134 (856).
'RA-vLE, supra at 5i; Friedly v. Scheetz, 9 S. & R. 156, 162 (Pa. 1823).
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tion of the purchase money he agreed to pay, and holding the
covenant he may not withhold the purchase money. But after
eviction he has a right to have his damages deducted from the
purchase-money." :39
At what time, or on the happening of what event, does a
breach occur? The covenants -of warranty and for quiet enjoy-
ment run until the covenantee is evicted, but the covenants for
seisin, right to convey and against encumbrances are broken, if
at all, at the moment of their creation. These covenants are then
turned into mere rights of action; which are not assignable at
law, and can be pursued only by the covenantee or his personal
representatives; nor can they pass to an heir, devisee or subse-
quent purchaser. 140 In many states, however, the assignee by
statute has a right of action for a breach of those covenants.
Moreover, when the paramount owner seeks to evict one who
is entitled to the benefits of any of the covenants for title, he can
b~y giving proper notice of the action to the party bound by the
covenants and requiring him to defend them, relieve himself
from the burden of proving the validity of his title. "The notice
should be unequivocal, certain and explicit." 141
Lastly, may be mentioned briefly the remedies for infringing
the agreements of covenantors. Formerly an action of covenant
was sometimes made to serve as a bill in equity to which an equi-
table defense might be given, but so far as regards the instrument
on which the action is founded, it is strictly an action at law
under seal. 142 An assignee or grantee may maintain an action
of covenant against any of the prior grantors or assignors who
have entered into a general warranty of title, whether he have a
warranty or not to himself, against any of the prior grantors or
'Wilson v. Cochran, Christy v. Reynolds, both supra note 123; Paul v.
Witman, 3 W. & S. 407 (Pa. I842) ; Fuhrman v. Loudon, Lighty v. Short, both
supra note 132; Dobbins v. Brown, supra note 43; Cathcart v. Bowman, supra
note 23; Murphy v. Richardson, 28 Pa. 288, 292. I857) ; Beauplaud v. McKean,
supra note i; Knepper v. Kurtz, supra note 40.
ItoRAWLE, supra at 318; Williams v. O'Donnell, supra note 117.
'Paul v. Witman, supra note 139; Bender v. Fromberger, 4 Dall.'436, 437
(U. S. I8o6); Collingswood v. Irwin, 3 W. 3o6, 3IO (Pa. 1834).
' Lehigh Coal Co. v. Harlan, 27 Pa. 429, 442 (1856).
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assignors.4 3 This rule is in harmony with the rule in all or most
of the states." '
As a covenant is under seal, an action must be brought
thereon in the name of the covenantee, 45 in debt, or covenant.' 46
But when the agreement has been altered by parol, transforming
it into a new and independent one, then the proper action is. as-
sumpsit.' 47 Said Chief Justice Gibson: "That covenant is not
maintainable on a heterogeneous agreement as a common law
remedy is most undoubted; and for the reason that a contract
rests partly in writing and partly in parol." .48
A suit may be for the use of those beneficially interested.1 4 9
In these cases the court controls the execution and applies the
money in accordance with the agreement.' 50 The action, when
the agreement is thus made for the benefit of another, must be
brought in the name of the party who made it, and not by the
beneficiary.' 5 ' Thus covenant may be maintained for the pur-
chaser of land by agreement under seal, by which the payment of
the purchase-money is to be paid by the vendor to a third person
-in the name of the vendor for the use of such person.152 Like-
wise if a railroad company has the right of way over mining
lands and covenants with the owner that on notice it will change
its location, a tenant of the owner may sue in the name of his
landlord for a breach of the covenant.' 68
An action for not performing an agreement under seal to
convey land must be brought by the personal representative of the
'"Le Ray de Chaumont v. Forsythe, supra note 13.
=" RAWIX, suPa at § 214.
'=De Bolle v. Pa. Insurance Co., 4 WVh. 68 (Pa. 1838) ; Ardesco Oil Co. v.
North American Oil Co., 66 Pa. 375 (i87o).
" McManus v. Cassidy, 66 Pa. 260 (i87o).
Ur Vicary v. Moore, 2 W. 451 (I834) ; Vaughn v. Ferris, 2 W. & S. 46
(1841) ; Spangler v. Springer, 22 Pa. 455 (1854) ; Lawall v. Rader, 24 Pa. 283
(I855)1 Lehigh Coal Co. v. Harlan, suPra note 142; McManus v. Cassidy,
supra note 146.
' Vicary v. Moore, supra note 147.
"De Bolle v. Pa. Insurance Co., Ardesco Oil Co. v. North American Oil
Co., both supra note T45.
I bid.
Strohecker v. Grant, I6 S. & R. 237 (Pa. 1827).
'Campbell v. Shrum, 3 W. 6o (Pa. 1834).
Mine Hill R. R. v. Lippincott, 86 Pa. 468 (1878).
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covenantor and not by his heir. He is also the proper party to
bring an action on a lease made by his ancestor to recover rent.
In Watson v. Blaine, 5 4 B sold to D a tract of land, and the
question arose if a second tract was sold. The counter evidence
of the second sale was the sale of it in several parcels to different
persons without informing D. His administrator brought a suit
against B's executor to recover damages. Should D's heir or
his administrator bring the suit? Said Chief justice Tilghman:
"The administrator of D, I apprehend, and no other person.
What other person can be entitled to an action? The contract
was with the testator. The action for breach of contract is a
personal action, which is transmitted to the personal representa-
tives. The heir does not succeed to an action of this kind. There
are contracts which belong to the realty, and run with the estate,
and such descend to the heir. If the ancestor, for instance, make
a lease, reserving rent, the rent which accrues after the death of
the ancestor, is incident to the reversion, and goes to the heir, who
may support an action on the lease made by his ancestor. So,
covenants by a tenant for making repairs, or doing other things on
the devised property, for the benefit of it, run with the land, and
the person seised of the reversion may support an action for
breach in his own time. But in the present instance, D was seised
of no estate, and therefore no estate descended to his heir. There
was no estate to which a covenant could be attached."
Lastly, a covenant in a deed, executed by virtue of a power
in the will to carry out an agreement made by the testator, cannot
be joined with a count against him on the testator's covenants.155
And if a lessor and his sureties jointly covenant to pay rent, an
action cannot be maintained against the sureties alone for rent
which accrued under the lease.
1 5 6
"M2 S. & R. I3 (Pa. 1824).
Strohecker v. Grant, supra note ISI.
Phillips v. Bonsall, 2 Binn. 138 (Pa. i8og) ; Philadelphia v. Reeves, 48
Pa. 472 (865).
